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INTRODUCTION
In its 2003 decision in State Farm Mutual Automobile Insur-
ance Co. v. Campbell,' the United States Supreme Court elabo-
rated on three "guideposts" that it had previously announced for
reviewing whether the amount of a punitive damages award is so
excessive as to violate federal due process.2 With respect to the
first guidepost - the reprehensibility of the defendant's conduct -
Campbell narrowed the ability of courts to consider conduct of the
defendant beyond that which harmed the plaintiff.3 With respect
to the second guidepost - the disparity between the punitive
award and the dollar amount representing harm to the plaintiff -
* Professor of Law, Roger Williams University School of Law. B.A.,
University of Virginia; J.D., Yale Law School.
1. 123 S. Ct. 1513 (2003).
2. Id. at 1521-26. In 1996, the Supreme Court announced three guide-
posts for reviewing whether a punitive damages award is so excessive as to
violate due process: (1) the degree of reprehensibility of the defendant's con-
duct, (2) the ratio between compensatory damages and punitive damages,
and (3) the difference between punitive damages and civil and criminal pen-
alties for comparable misconduct. See BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S.
559, 574-85 (1996).
3. See infra Part I.
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Campbell set forth numerical guidelines, although not "rigid
benchmarks."4 It stated that "few awards exceeding a single-digit
ratio.. . to a significant degree, will satisfy due process," and that
"an award of more than four times the amount of compensatory
damages might be close to the line of constitutional impropriety."5
As for the third guidepost - comparing punitive damages to civil
and criminal penalties for similar misconduct - Campbell down-
played the relevance of criminal sanctions in determining whether
a punitive award is unconstitutionally excessive. 6
Campbell involved claims against State Farm for fraud, inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress, and bad faith refusal to set-
tle within insurance policy limits. The state court jury had
awarded $1 million in compensatory damages for emotional dis-
tress and $145 million in punitive damages. 7 Analyzing the case
under the three guideposts, the Court concluded that the punitive
award was unconstitutionally excessive and suggested that a pu-
nitive award approximately equivalent to the amount of compen-
satory damages might be justified.s The Supreme Court remanded
the case to the state court for calculation of the punitive award in
light of the principles articulated in Campbell.9
Six months after the Campbell decision, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, in Mathias v. Accor
Economy Lodging, upheld a punitive award in a case involving
bedbug infestation of a Motel 6.10 The two plaintiffs had been bit-
ten by bedbugs while staying in the motel. Evidence at trial indi-
cated that the motel management had long known of the
infestation throughout the motel, but did not exterminate, and
that management instructed desk clerks to call the creatures
"ticks."1 The jury awarded each plaintiff $5,000 in compensatory
4. Campbell, 123 S. Ct. at 1524.
5. Id. (citing Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 23-24 (1991);
Gore, 517 U.S. at 581).
6. Id. at 1526.
7. Id. at 1519.
8. Id. at 1526 ("An application of the Gore guideposts to the facts of this
case ... likely would justify a punitive damages award at or near the amount
of compensatory damages.... The proper calculation of punitive damages
under the principles we have discussed should be resolved, in the first in-
stance, by the Utah courts.").
9. Id.
10. 347 F.3d 672 (7th Cir. 2003).
11. Id. at 675.
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damages and $186,000 in punitive damages.' 2 A news article on
the oral argument before the Seventh Circuit reported that Judge
Richard Posner, who later authored the opinion for the court, was
curious about the defendant's motivation to appeal:
"Why are you appealing?" Posner asked. "I'm puzzled by
this. It's a very small amount of money. You want your
bedbug experience to be discussed at length in the Fed-
eral Reporter?"
The bedbug experience was beside the point, [the defen-
dant's lawyer] explained. It was the punitive damages
that really had crawled under the corporation's skin-
especially since the plaintiffs had received only a $10,000
compensatory award. An inquisitive Posner pressed on.
"Are there a lot of bedbug cases?" he asked. "Are you wor-
ried about a flood of bedbug cases? Is this the first of
thousands, or what?"13
The Seventh Circuit upheld the punitive award.14 Notwith-
standing the relatively low financial stakes, the "bedbug" case is
important for Judge Posner's exposition of the purposes of puni-
tive damages and for his reaction to Campbell.
In this essay, I address just a few of the many issues arising
from Campbell and Mathias. In Part I, I discuss Campbell's asser-
tion that a punitive award may punish only conduct directed at
the plaintiff. This assertion raises questions about the continuing
vitality of the notions that recidivists may be punished more se-
verely than one-time offenders and that a legitimate purpose of
punitive damages is to deter unlawful conduct. I also examine how
conduct directed at others than the plaintiffs came into play in
Mathias. In Part II, I address various constitutional issues sur-
rounding how a punitive award may punish. Specifically, I explore
how Campbell, Mathias, and some other cases have gauged the
disparity between the amount of punitive damages and the harm
to the plaintiff. I also consider a separate issue regarding how to
12. Id. at 674.
13. John Gibeaut, Bugs Bite Guests, but Punitives Gnaw at Hotel: 7th
Circuit Upholds Damages Over Bedbug Infestation, 2 A.B.A. J. EREPORT 43,
para. 4-6 (Oct. 31, 2003), at WL 43 ABAJEREP 3.
14. Mathias, 347 F.3d at 678.
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punish - whether a low probability of detection or punishment of
the defendant's unlawful conduct justifies a larger punitive award.
Campbell decided that on the facts of that case, the low probabil-
ity that the defendant would be punished for its many other in-
stances of misconduct was irrelevant; Mathias, by contrast,
asserted that the defendant's efforts to escape detection supported
the punitive award in that case.
I. PUNISHABLE CONDUCT
Prior to Campbell, some courts allowed punitive awards to
punish a broad course of conduct by defendants. 15 The Supreme
Court in Campbell indicated that such a use of punitive damages
violates due process. The Court stated that the "defendant should
be punished for the conduct that harmed the plaintiff, not for be-
ing an unsavory individual or business."16 Part of the Court's mo-
tivation for this rule seems to be rooted in a concern about
multiple punishment for the same conduct. That is, if a single
award punishes both defendant conduct that harmed the plaintiff
and defendant conduct that has harmed or may harm others,
there is the possibility that a case brought by a subsequent plain-
tiff will result in a punitive award against the defendant for con-
duct already punished in the prior suit. Campbell warned that
courts may not "adjudicate the merits of other parties' hypotheti-
cal claims against a defendant under the guise of the reprehensi-
bility analysis."17 The Court noted, however, that evidence of
similar acts by the defendant having "a nexus to the specific harm
15. See, e.g., Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 174 Cal. Rptr. 348 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1981). Grimshaw, a widely cited case involving the Ford Pinto, has been
one of the leading cases on the use of punitive damages to punish a broad
course of conduct by the defendant. At least one California appellate court
has held that Campbell has undermined much of Grimshaw. See Romo v.
Ford Motor Co., 6 Cal. Rptr. 3d 793, 801-03 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003).
16. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 123 S. Ct. 1513, 1523
(2003). The Supreme Court also noted that a court may not award "punitive
damages to punish and deter conduct that b[ears] no relation to the [plain-
tiffs] harm." Id.
17. Id. The Supreme Court also discussed out-of-state conduct in detail.
First, an award may not punish conduct that was lawful where it occurred.
Id. at 1522. Second, an award may not punish unlawful out-of-state conduct,
because the state ordinarily has no legitimate interest in punishing a defen-
dant for unlawful acts committed elsewhere. Id. at 1521-23.
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suffered by the plaintiff' may be "probative when it demonstrates
the deliberateness and culpability of the defendant's action."' 8
The reference in Campbell to "other parties' hypothetical
claims" was included in the Supreme Court's discussion of the dis-
similar conduct of State Farm that apparently had been punished
by the state court.' 9 However, given the Supreme Court's concern
about multiple punishment for the same conduct, the Court's lan-
guage arguably indicates that even conduct that is similar to that
directed towards the plaintiff is not a permissible basis for a puni-
tive award.20
While seemingly suggesting that an award may not punish
conduct that was directed at someone other than the plaintiff,
Campbell did reaffirm the notion - widely accepted in the criminal
context - that repetitive misconduct may be punished more se-
verely than first-time misconduct.21 After acknowledging that re-
cidivists may be punished more severely than first-time offenders,
the Court cautioned that repeat misconduct in the civil context is
relevant only when related to the conduct directed at the plain-
tiff. 2 2
As an abstract matter, it is possible to distinguish between
punishing the defendant more severely for repeat misconduct
(which the Court suggests is permissible) and punishing the de-
fendant for conduct other than that directed at the plaintiff (which
the Court suggests is impermissible). The status of the defendant
as a repeat wrongdoer is what justifies more severe punishment
for the conduct directed at the plaintiff. By contrast, the conduct of
the defendant directed at others may not be directly punished.
As a practical matter, it may be difficult to distinguish be-
tween enhanced punishment for recidivism and direct punishment
18. Id. at 1522.
19. Id. at 1516.
20. The Supreme Court suggested, however, that conduct directed at
nonparties "may be probative when it demonstrates the deliberateness and
culpability of the defendant's action in the State where it is tortious, but that
conduct must have a nexus to the specific harm suffered by the plaintiff." Id.
at 1522.
21. Id. at 1523 ("'[Olur holdings that a recidivist may be punished more
severely than a first offender recognize that repeated misconduct is more rep-
rehensible than an individual instance of malfeasance. . . .'" (quoting BMW of
N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 577 (1996))).
22. Id.
20041
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of misconduct other than that directed towards the plaintiff. To
prove the defendant's deliberateness and culpability, Campbell al-
lows the introduction of evidence of defendant misconduct that is
related to the misconduct directed at the plaintiff. After Campbell,
however, the body making the decision about the amount of puni-
tive damages (usually the jury) apparently is barred from using
this evidence to punish the defendant's broad course of conduct.
Judicial monitoring of the lawyers' arguments and careful phras-
ing of jury instructions are possible ways for reconciling the rule
that similar conduct may be introduced with the rule that only
conduct directed at the plaintiff may be punished.
In Campbell, the Supreme Court thought it evident from the
trial record and the state court opinions that the punitive award
did punish more than conduct directed at the plaintiff.23 Compare
this to Mathias, in which the Seventh Circuit stated that "it [was]
probably not a coincidence" that the total award for each plaintiff
equaled $1,000 per room in the hotel.24 If the Mathias jury did se-
lect the amount by a sanction per room, then one might argue that
the jury had punished the conduct of the defendant directed at
others - i.e., guests who stayed in the other 190 rooms of the bed-
bug-infested hotel. If other guests brought their own bedbug com-
plaints, and received punitive awards, then the defendant would
be subjected to multiple punishment for the same conduct.
Judge Posner did not discuss whether the award impermissi-
bly punished conduct directed at others. Rather, he emphasized
that the selection of an amount of punitive damages is necessarily
arbitrary. 25 He noted that "as there are no punitive-damages
guidelines, corresponding to the federal and state sentencing
guidelines, it is inevitable that the specific amount of punitive
damages awarded whether by a judge or by a jury will be arbi-
23. Id. (stating that "we have no doubt" that the Utah Supreme Court
had upheld the punitive award by allowing "the merits of other parties' hypo-
thetical claims against the defendant" to be included). In support, the U.S.
Supreme Court quoted the Utah Supreme Court: "Even if the harm to the
Campbells can be appropriately characterized as minimal, the trial court's
assessment of the situation is on target: 'The harm is minor to the individual
but massive in the aggregate.'" Id. (citation omitted).
24. Mathias v. Accor Econ. Lodging, Inc., 347 F.3d 672, 678 (7th Cir.
2003) ("It is probably not a coincidence that $5,000 + $186,000 =
$191,000/191=$1,000: i.e., $1,000 per room in the hotel.").
25. Id.
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trary."26 He added that "Itihe judicial function is to police a range,
not a point."27 In other words, the method apparently chosen by
the Mathias jury to fix an amount of punitive damages was as le-
gitimate as any other method that does not result in a "grossly ex-
cessive" punitive award. If the due process requirement, as
indicated in Campbell, is that a punitive award not punish con-
duct directed at others, then regulating the evidence that is intro-
duced at trial and crafting careful jury instructions - rather than
scrutinizing the amount of the punitive award - would seem to be
the most effective way to meet this requirement.
Another question that arises from Campbell's instruction that
a punitive award should not punish conduct directed at others is
whether and how a punitive award is to achieve its traditional
goal of deterring the defendant and others from committing simi-
lar acts. 28 If the punitive award is limited to punishing conduct di-
rected at the plaintiff, then it is possible that the punitive award
in the individual case will not serve as a deterrent. Campbell, al-
though acknowledging that punitive damages may aim at deter-
rence, 29 does not discuss how a punitive award based solely on
conduct directed at an individual plaintiff can achieve this goal if
the defendant engaged in conduct harming many.30 If the Court
believes that deterrence remains a legitimate objective of punitive
damages, then perhaps the deterrence must come through either
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. See, e.g., Campbell, 123 S. Ct. at 1519 ("[Pjunitive damages serve a
broader function [than compensatory damages]; they are aimed at deterrence
and retribution."); BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 568 (1996)
("Punitive damages may properly be imposed to further a State's legitimate
interests in punishing unlawful conduct and deterring its repetition.").
29. See supra note 28.
30. Two post-Campbell cases in California illustrate the differing views
of how the deterrence function has been affected by Campbell. Compare Romo
v. Ford Motor Co., 6 Cal. Rptr. 3d 793, 805 & n.7 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003) (finding
error in instruction that jury could consider "[tihe amount of punitive dam-
ages which will have a deterrent effect on the defendant in light of defen-
dant's financial condition" because it did not restrict the jury to punishment
and deterrence based solely on the harm to the plaintiffs), with Simon v. San
Paolo U.S. Holding Co., 7 Cal. Rptr. 3d 367, 391 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003) (assert-
ing that the amount of a punitive award should "further the California public
policy of punishing the defendant and making an example, in order to dis-
courage him and others from perpetrating fraud in the future").
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class actions or the cumulative impact of individual punitive
awards in individual suits.
II. How TO PUNISH
Once conduct is deemed punishable, the question then arises
as to constitutional constraints on how to punish. Campbell and
Mathias both discuss at some length the guidepost that there be a
reasonable relationship between the amount of the punitive award
and the harm to the plaintiff. The harm to the plaintiff commonly
is represented by the award of compensatory damages, but it may
also be represented by the actual harm suffered by the plaintiff
beyond what is legally compensable, and it may be represented by
the potential harm to the plaintiff threatened by the defendant's
conduct. Separate from issues concerning the ratio analysis are
questions about how a low probability of detection or punishment
of the defendant's misconduct should influence the analysis of
whether a punitive award is unconstitutionally excessive. In this
part, I will address how Campbell, Mathias, and some other cases
have approached the disparity between a punitive award and the
harm to the plaintiff. I will then turn to the remarks in Campbell
and Mathias about the relevance to the excessiveness inquiry of a
low probability of detection or punishment.
A. Disparity Between Punitive Award and Harm to Plaintiff
The Supreme Court prior to Campbell had indicated that
whether a punitive award is unconstitutionally excessive depends
in part on the disparity between the punitive award and the com-
pensatory award.3 1 Campbell commented that on the facts of the
case before it, "we have no doubt there is a presumption against
an award that has a 145-to-1 ratio."32 Prefacing this remark, the
Court stated:
We decline again to impose a bright-line ratio which a
punitive damages award cannot exceed. Our jurispru-
dence and the principles it has now established demon-
strate, however, that, in practice, few awards exceeding a
31. See Gore, 517 U.S. at 580-83; TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp.,
509 U.S. 443, 459-62 (1993); Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 23
(1991).
32. Campbell, 123 S. Ct. at 1524.
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single-digit ratio between punitive and compensatory
damages, to a significant degree, will satisfy due proc-
ess .... [A]n award of more than four times the amount
of compensatory damages might be close to the line of
constitutional impropriety. 33
In light of this language, some courts have vested the "single-
digit multiplier" concept with great significance; 34 at least one
court has suggested that a 4 to 1 ratio is the outermost limit per-
missible under Campbell.35 The opinion in Mathias, by contrast,
asserted: "The Supreme Court did not... lay down a 4-to-1 or sin-
gle-digit ratio rule - it said merely that 'there is a presumption
against an award that has a 145-to-1 ratio' - and it would be un-
reasonable to do so."36
Judge Posner upheld the punitive to compensatory ratio of
37.2 to 1 in Mathias in part because "[tlhe defendant's behavior
was outrageous but the compensable harm done was slight and at
the same time difficult to quantify because a large element of it
was emotional."37 The notion that a small compensatory award
might justify a ratio between punitive and compensatory damages
greater than a single-digit multiplier has some support in the
Campbell opinion. The Supreme Court in Campbell asserted that
due process may permit "ratios greater than those we have previ-
ously upheld" when "'a particularly egregious act has resulted in
33. Id. (citing Haslip, 499 U.S. at 23-24).
34. See, e.g., Zhang v. Am. Gem Seafoods, Inc., 339 F.3d 1020, 1044 (9th
Cir. 2003) (upholding a 7 to 1 ratio and stating, "We are aware of no Supreme
Court or Ninth Circuit case disapproving of a single-digit ratio between puni-
tive and compensatory damages, and we decline to extend the law in this
case"); Romo, 6 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 812 (holding that a punitive damages award
more than ten times the amount of compensatory damages was unconstitu-
tionally excessive and stating that "a punitive damages award of triple the
compensatory award to the individual plaintiffs would be constitutionally
reasonable"); Simon, 7 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 393 ("The amount awarded here,
$1,700,000, is only $80,000 more than a 1 to 4 ratio given the actual harm of
$405,000, which we find insignificant for purposes of the due process analysis
under State Farm.").
35. Diamond Woodworks, Inc. v. Argonaut Ins. Co., 135 Cal. Rptr. 2d
736, 760-61 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003) ("[W]ith regard to the ratio of punitive dam-
ages to compensatory damages, however, we have no doubt that anything ex-
ceeding four-to-one would not comport with due process under Campbell.").
36. Mathias v. Accor Econ. Lodging, Inc., 347 F.3d 672, 676 (7th Cir.
2003) (citation omitted).
37. Id. at 677.
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only a small amount of economic damages'" or when "'the injury is
hard to detect or the monetary value of noneconomic harm might
have been difficult to determine."' 38 On the other hand, when com-
pensatory damages are substantial, Campbell suggested that "a
lesser ratio, perhaps only equal to compensatory damages, can
reach the outermost limit of the due process guarantee."39
It is important to stress that in both Campbell and its prior
decisions, the Supreme Court spoke not only of the ratio between
punitive damages and compensatory damages, but also of the dis-
parity between punitive damages and actual harm or potential
harm to the plaintiff.40 For example, in TXO Production Corp. v.
Alliance Resources Corp. ,41 the Supreme Court stated that review-
ing courts should inquire into "'whether there is a reasonable rela-
tionship between the punitive damages award and the harm likely
to result from the defendant's conduct as well as the harm that ac-
tually has occurred."' 42 TXO upheld a $10 million punitive award,
when compensatory damages were only $19,000; the Court sug-
gested that the potential harm to the plaintiff if the defendant's
tortious plan had succeeded was at least $1 million.43 The Court
then concluded that the ratio of not more than 10 to 1 did not "'jar
one's constitutional sensibilities.' Campbell reaffirmed the no-
tion that reviewing courts should compare the plaintiffs harm, or
potential harm, to the punitive damages award.45
38. Campbell, 123 S. Ct. at 1524 (quoting BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore,
517 U.S. 559, 582 (1996).
39. Id.
40. See, e.g., id. at 1520 (stating that Gore instructs courts to consider
"the disparity between the actual or potential harm suffered by the plaintiff
and the punitive damages award"); Gore, 517 U.S. at 575, 582-83; TXO Prod.
Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 460 (1993) (holding that a ratio of
ten times the potential harm to plaintiffs "was not so 'grossly excessive' as to
violate due process," although it was 526 times greater than the actual dam-
ages awarded by the jury).
41. 509 U.S. 443 (1993).
42. Id. at 460 (quoting Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 21
(1991)).
43. Id. at 462.
44. Id. ("While petitioner stresses the shocking disparity between the
punitive award and the compensatory award, that shock dissipates when one
considers the potential loss to respondents, in terms of reduced or eliminated
royalties payments, had petitioner succeeded in its illicit scheme.").
45. See Campbell, 123 S. Ct. at 1524; Gore, 517 U.S. at 582 & n.35.
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A court's focus on the "actual harm" to the plaintiff as opposed
to the compensatory damages awarded may make a profound dif-
ference in how the ratio is analyzed. For example, in a post-
Campbell decision, a California appellate court upheld a punitive
damages award that was 340 times greater than the amount of
compensatory damages awarded.46 The court reasoned that the ac-
tual harm to the plaintiff was much greater than that reflected in
the compensatory award - the plaintiff had been denied the "bene-
fit of the bargain," a type of loss that under the facts of the case
was not compensable under California law.4 7 By calculating actual
harm to include the loss of the benefit of the bargain, the court de-
termined that the ratio between punitive damages and plaintiff
harm was approximately 4 to 1.48
Another post-Campbell decision involving interesting issues
about "actual harm" is a recent federal district court opinion in the
Exxon Valdez oil spill litigation. 49 In reviewing a $5 billion puni-
tive damages award, the federal district court judge based the ac-
tual harm to the thousands of plaintiffs not only on the aggregate
of several compensatory awards, but also on amounts that Exxon
had paid in pre-judgment payments and settlements. 50 The Ninth
Circuit, however, had previously stated in the same litigation that
"lt]he amount a defendant voluntarily pays before judgment
should generally not be used as part of the [ratio analysis], be-
cause that would deter settlements prior to judgment."51 In re-
sponse, the trial judge asserted that this "general rule" did not
apply to the litigation at hand because the jury had been specifi-
cally instructed that in determining the amount of punitive dam-
ages, it could consider in mitigation the voluntary payments that
Exxon had made before the judgment. 52 The Exxon Valdez litiga-
tion thus raises the important question whether "actual harm" for
46. Simon v. San Paolo U.S. Holding Co., 7 Cal. Rptr. 3d 367, 383-93
(Cal. Ct. App. 2003).
47. Id. at 388.
48. Id. at 387-91 (noting in a real estate fraud case that compensatory
damages, based on out-of-pocket expenses, were $5,000, but that harm to
plaintiff was $400,000 more, based on its loss of the "benefit of the bargain,"
even though such a loss is not compensable under California law).
49. In re the Exxon Valdez, 2004 WL 170354 (D. Alaska 2004).
50. Id. at *22.
51. In re the Exxon Valdez, 270 F.3d 1215, 1244 (9th Cir. 2001).
52. In re the Exxon Valdez, 2004 WL 170354 at *23.
2004] 589
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purposes of the ratio analysis should be discounted based on vol-
untary payments made by the defendant before judgment.
Comparison to "potential harm" might make an even bigger
difference than comparison to "actual harm" in how a reviewing
court will perceive the disparity between punitive damages and
plaintiff harm. TXO is one example of this. Another example
arises from a current case in which Alabama has asserted that
Exxon intentionally underpaid natural gas royalties to the state. 53
In November 2003, the jury awarded Alabama $11.8 billion in pu-
nitive damages and $63.6 million in compensatory damages - a
ratio of 180 to 1.54 The trial judge subsequently ordered that the
award of punitive damages be remitted to $3.5 billion, which is
approximately 55 times the amount of compensatory damages. 55
In finding a punitive award of $3.5 billion consistent with state
and federal constitutional constraints, the judge considered the
relevant ratio to be that between punitive damages and the poten-
tial harm to the state if Exxon's wrongful conduct had not been
discovered (a ratio that, depending on the estimate of potential
harm used, was either approximately 9 to 1 or 4 to 1).56
In sum, while Campbell has language that seemingly tight-
ened the permissible ratios between punitive damages and com-
pensatory damages, it left open the possibility that higher ratios
might be justified in certain circumstances. Several courts have
read Campbell to impose a limit of a single-digit multiplier. Judge
Posner's opinion in Mathias is an exception, with its emphasis on
the slight amount of compensatory damages and the egregious-
ness of the defendant's behavior. Moreover, Campbell did not re-
53. See Dee McAree, Punitives War has New Battleground: Exxon Loses a
Huge Verdict in Alabama, 26 NAT'L L. J. 13 (Nov. 24, 2003) (discussing State
of Alabama v. Exxon Corp., CV-99-2369 (Montgomery County Cir. Ct., Ala.
15th Cir.))
54. Id.
55. Alabama v. Exxon Corp., No. 99-2368 (Montgomery County Cir. Ct.,
Ala. 15th Cir. Mar. 29, 2004) (post-judgment order).
56. The trial judge noted that expert testimony indicated Exxon's antici-
pated gain from its wrongful conduct was $930 million, and that a more con-
servative estimate of the anticipated gain was $386 million. Based on the
"conservative calculation" of $386 million, the trial court determined that "an
award of $3.5 billion in punitive damages would necessarily preserve a sin-
gle-digit ratio between punitive damages and anticipated gain." Id. With re-
spect to the $930 million calculation, the court observed that a $3.5 billion
punitive award would produce a 3.75 to 1 ratio. Id.
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vise the notion that actual or potential harm to the plaintiffs (as
opposed to merely the amount of compensatory damages awarded)
could be considered by a reviewing court in determining whether a
punitive award is grossly excessive. This has produced differing
views in the lower courts as to how to fix a dollar amount on the
plaintiffs harm for purposes of comparison to the punitive dam-
ages award.
B. Low Probability of Detection or Punishment
Prior to Campbell, the Supreme Court had stated that a
higher ratio between punitive and compensatory damages might
"be justified in cases in which the injury is hard to detect."5 7
Campbell reaffirmed this statement in reviewing the $145 million
punitive award against State Farm.58 The Utah Supreme Court
had upheld the award in part because "State Farm [would] only be
punished in one out of every 50,000 cases as a matter of statistical
probability."59 The U.S. Supreme Court, however, asserted that
the low probability that State Farm would be punished for other
misconduct was not relevant when that misconduct was uncon-
nected to the actual harm suffered by the plaintiffs. 60 This raises
the question whether, after Campbell, wrongdoing that may be
hard to detect or rarely punished can justify a higher punitive
award than would otherwise be constitutionally permissible.
In Mathias, Judge Posner asserted that a low probability of
detecting or punishing defendant misconduct may warrant in-
creased punishment. He asserted that punitive damages should be
"proportional to the wrongfulness of the defendant's action," sub-
ject to two qualifications: "when the probability of detection is very
low ... or the crime is potentially lucrative."61 He added that "[iif
a tortfeasor is 'caught' only half the time he commits torts, then
when he is caught he should be punished twice as heavily in order
57. BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 582 (1996).
58. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 123 S. Ct. 1513, 1524
(2003) (quoting Gore, 517 U.S. at 582).
59. Campbell v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 65 P.3d 1134, 1153
(Utah 2001), quoted in Campbell, 123 S. Ct. at 1525.
60. Id. ("Here the argument that State Farm will be punished in only the
rare case, coupled with reference to its assets.., had little to do with the ac-
tual harm sustained by the Campbells.").
61. Mathias v. Accor Econ. Lodging, Inc., 347 F.3d 672, 676 (7th Cir.
2003).
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to make up for the times he gets away."62 Judge Posner observed
that the hotel had attempted to "pass off the bedbugs as ticks,
which some guests might ignorantly have thought less unhealth-
ful," and that this effort at concealing the infestation might "have
postponed the instituting of litigation to rectify the hotel's miscon-
duct."63 Moreover, he suggested that this effort to escape detection
made it possible for the hotel to profit from its misconduct.64 Ac-
cordingly, it was appropriate that the punitive award limited "the
defendant's ability to profit from its fraud by escaping detection
and (private) prosecution."65
Judge Posner did not address whether this "low probability of
detection or punishment" view is consistent with Campbell. One
possible way to reconcile the cases on this point is that the Su-
preme Court in Campbell assumed that the other instances of
State Farm's misconduct did not have a sufficient nexus to the
plaintiffs harm, while in Mathias, the defendant's conduct in con-
cealing the infestation throughout the hotel was directly related to
the harm suffered by the plaintiffs. To the extent that courts im-
plement the view that a tortfeasor who is "caught" only a portion
of the time it commits torts should be punished more severely,
analysis of the disparity between punitive damages and plaintiff
harm may be significantly affected.
62. Id. at 677.
63. Id.
64. Id. Judge Posner also justified the amount of the punitive award on
other grounds. He asserted that "[tihe defendant's behavior was outrageous
but the compensable harm done was slight and at the same time difficult to
quantify because a large element of it was emotional." Id. He likened the
facts of the case to deliberately spitting in a person's face. In a tort suit for
the spitting, he posited, punitive damages may be necessary:
Compensatory damages would not do the trick in such a case, and
this for three reasons: because they are difficult to determine in the
case of acts that inflict largely dignitary harms; because in the spit-
ting case they would be too slight to give the victim an incentive to
sue;... and because to limit the plaintiff to compensatory damages
would enable the defendant to commit the offensive act with impu-
nity provided that he was willing to pay.
Id. at 676-77.
65. Id. at 677.
THE "BEDBUG" CASE
CONCLUSION
State Farm v. Campbell, the Supreme Court's most recent de-
cision on the constitutional review of punitive damages, in many
respects tightened due process limits on punitive awards. The
Seventh Circuit decision in Mathias illustrates, however, the lee-
way that remains for reviewing courts to uphold punitive awards
that exceed the numerical ratios discussed in Campbell. It will be
interesting to observe whether, in the wake of the Campbell stric-
tures, lower courts will give greater emphasis to a factor that was
significant in Mathias - the low probability that the defendant's
wrongdoing would be detected or punished. Moreover, one won-
ders whether the Supreme Court will revisit its doctrine that re-
viewing courts may consider actual or potential harm to the
plaintiff (as opposed to merely the compensatory damages
awarded) in determining whether a punitive award is excessive
when compared to the plaintiff harm. The ongoing Exxon Valdez
oil spill litigation in federal court and the Alabama v. Exxon case
moving through the state court system are examples of how "ac-
tual harm" and "potential harm," respectively, have been used by
reviewing courts to justify large punitive awards - in these two
cases, multi-billion dollar awards. It remains to be seen whether
the Supreme Court will consider either of these cases. What seems
certain, however, is that Campbell will not be the Court's last
word on the constitutional review of punitive damages.
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